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CASES ON MORTGAGES. By James L. Parks. St. Paul: West Publishing Com-
pany. 1926. pp. xiii, 587.
Professor Parks states that the purpose of his book is "to show the student
how American courts are dealing with questions in mortgage law." How well
does the book accomplish its purpose? The book follows very closely the plan
of its predecessors. "Occasionally," however, "the editor has departed from
the arrangement of topics and cases usually adopted by other authors." 1
Any attempt to add new devices for instruction, for example, anything like
Professor Campbell's experiment with problem cases, 2 there is not.
But rather than to dwell upon what the book is not, and to criticize and
commend accordingly, the reviewer will examine it for what it is-namely,
a customary presentation of materials, designed apparently to facilitate con-
ventional legal instruction in this subject. 3 What is there traditional in its
technique of presenting materials? English cases have been used "only to give
a historical background, as a starting point for the student's investigation."
"Recent American opinions, which seem to be well reasoned," have been
selected for the most part. In Chapter III-Restrictions Upon the Right
to Redeem-a conglomerate of fact-transactions is represented in the cases,
but the cases are put together "because they involve merely different appli-
cations of one great principle." In Chapter V of this book -General Prin-
ciples Governing Priorities - is to be found a collection of cases which "deal
only with general principles, and not with questions of priorities pec-uliar to
the mortgage transaction." These are some of the more general indicia of
the traditional teaching-tool in mortgages. They tend to indicate both the
"how" and the "why" of its construction. Further search will reveal the
traditional "how" more fully. Let us examine Chapter I -The Nature of
a Mortgage. It begins with the familiar quotation from Coke upon Littleton.
Then follows a case where a mortgagee is suing the mortgagor in ejectment,
after default.4 There had been no demand for possession. Then there is a
case where trespass de bonis asportatis is brought by a chattel mortgagor
against the mortgagee who took possession peaceably before default.5 There
was no provision in the papers that the mortgagor should have possession. The
next case briefly reports that an issue was made as to whether certain mort-
gages were fairly cancelled by the mortgagee or whether the mortgagor stole
them and made the cancellation. 6 To this case is appended, in a footnote, a
I The material is divided into 13 chapters as follows: I. The Nature of a Mort-
gage; II. Equitable Mortgages; III. Restrictions Upon the Right to Redeem; IV.
Obligations which may be Secured by a Mortgage; V. General Principles Governing
Pdorities; VI. The Rights and Duties of the Parties Before Foreclosure; VII. Agree-
ments Extending the Time for Performance of the Secured Obligation; VIII. Trans-
fer of a Mortgagee's Interest; IX. Transfer of a Mortgagor's Interest; X. Discharge
of a Mortgage; XI. Redemption from a Mortgage; XII. Subrogation, Contribution,
and Exoneration -Marshalling Assets; XIII. Foreclosure: (i) By Entry and By
Action, (2) By Exercising a Power of Sale. There are liberal annotations with cases
" accord," " contra," and " see." Some of the work in the law reviews is cited. An
appendix contains the final draft of the proposed Uniform (Real Property) Mortgage
Act. The draftsman's notes are omitted.
2 CAMPBELL, CASES ON MORTGAGES (1926).
3 For purposes of this review only, the feasibility of a separate course in Mort-
gages is assumed.
4 Doe ex dern. Roby v. Maisey, 8 B. & C. 767 (K. B. 1828); PARKS, p. 2.
5 Jameson v. Bruce, 6 Gill & J. (Md. 1834); PARKS, p. 3.
6 Harrison v. Owen, i Atk. 520 (Ch. 1738); PARKS, p. 5.
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note by Hargrave and Butler to Coke upon Littleton. It compares the nature
of a mortgage at common law with civil law doctrine. Then follows an excerpt
from an opinion, which begins: "What is a mortgage? "7 Then comes a case
where the mortgagor of land sues to recover possession from a third party
stranger.8 The mortgage was still in force, but the mortgagee had not taken
possession. Following this is a case of a civil action by a mortgagor against
a mortgagee of land specifically to enforce an oral agreement to release the
mortgage notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds. Then there is a New
York case holding that an unpaid mortgage of land was not properly distributed
as personal property of the mortgagees -in accord with objections of certain
legatees.' 0 Following this case is an extensive extract from an opinion by
Judge Field in a California case 11 reporting his observations concerning the
nature of mortgages. The statement of facts and part of the opinion are
omitted. Following this is a case where a judgment creditor is attacking his
debtor's deed of trust as ineffective against him because it was in the nature
of a mortgage and was not duly recorded. 1 2 Another trust deed follows where
the borrower-trustor sues somebody in ejectment 13 -who is sued does not
appear for part of the statement of facts is omitted. In the last case a mort-
gagee of cows sues to recover the proceeds of the sale of 87 calves which were
in gestation when the mortgage was executed and which were born before f ore-
closure. 14 Defendant sheriff held the proceeds subject to the validity of the
mortgagee's claim as against that of a purchaser from the mortgagor after de-
fault. The mortgage papers were silent concerning whether the offspring were
included. A footnote to this case contains an extract from an opinion in an-
other case declaring the distinction between a chattel mortgage and a pledge.
What is the design in assembling under this chapter heading such a hetero-
geneous group of fact-transactions? Why, for instance, are the cases involv-
ing controversies over possession found here, when they are also in Chapter VI
which deals with the Rights and Duties of the Parties Before Foreclosure?
If the business transactions represented in the several cases are of no particu-
lar importance, why does not Chapter I - The Nature of a Mortgage - take
in Equitable Mortgages (Chapter II)? If the fact-transactions may be
scrapped or scrambled, why is not Chapter IV -Obligations which may be
Secured by a Mortgage -in this chapter? Likewise, why omit the chapter
on Foreclosure or on Redemption? Indeed, if the fact-transactions are sub-
ordinate, what part of a case-book on mortgages is to be classified outside
of "The Nature of a Mortgage" ?
Conceding, however, that one may classify and arrange for what purpose
one pleases, we may go to the "why" of the classification, arrangement or
plan of presentation of the materials. What is the design of the collection of
cases and opinion excerpts in Chapter I? What do they have in common
which it is useful to teach to law students? One finds the thread on which
these cases are strung in the observations in the opinions concerning the nature
of a mortgage. One reads therein that, according to English common law, a
mortgage was a conveyance on a condition subsequent; "the legal estate"
vested in the mortgagee. Similar common law was made in some of the Amer-
7 Plumer, V. C., in Quarrell v. Beckford, r Madd. 269 (Ch. I816); PARxs, p. 6.
8 Ellison v. Daniels, ii N. H. 274 (1840); PARKS, p. 6.
9 Stevens v. Turlington, i86 N. C. 191, ii9 S. E. 210 (1923); PARKS, p. 9.
10 In re Albrecht's Estate, 23o N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632 (1892); PARKS, p. 13.
" McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365 (i858); PARKS, p. 14.
12 H1offman, Burmester & Co. v. Mackall et aL, 5 Ohio St. 124 (1855); PARKs,
P. 17.
13 Wisconsin Cent. R. R. v. Wisconsin River Land Co., 71 Wis. 94, 36 N. W. 837
(1888); PARKS, p. 19.
'4 Demers v. Graham, 36 Mont. 402, 93 Pac. 268 (,907); PARKS, p. 20.
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ican states. According to equity, however, a mortgage was regarded as
"merely a security," and we witness a faltering but progressive tendency of
the law courts and all courts to absorb the equitable theory - to disregard the
form, to hold that "the title" does not pass, to recognize that the mortgagor
is the "real" and "beneficial owner "; that is, to adopt "the lien theory."
Is this information useful to law students as a report on "how the American
courts are dealing with questions in mortgage law" ? Answer: Yes. But how
useful? Is it an accurate report of how American courts are dealing with
those questions further than that they sometimes write of these matters in
their opinions? Is there a "lien theory" or a "title theory" which can be
said to be the reliable reason for the decision of the given case, or which can be
relied upon to predict a decision in a subsequent case different on its "facts "?
Suppose we think of a purchase-money mortgage of lands or chattels, will the
theory or generalization that there is only "instantaneous seizin" or "title"
in the mortgagor yield to the theory, announced by the same court in another
case, that a mortgage is "merely a lien" ? If B desires to buy land or chat-
tels from S and procures A to buy them from S and A pays for them and takes
a mortgage thereon from B for the price, may A have "the title" although
the given court has declared that a mortgage is really "merely a lien for
security"? If X conveys to B in trust to hold as security for bondholders,
or to Y by deed absolute in form, may "the title" pass although it is "really
a mortgage" and "merely for security" and although the same court has
declared in some other cases that "a mortgage" is "merely a lien "? On
the other hand, will a court which has declared in other cases that a mort-
gage of land is a transfer of "the title" according to common law, accord the
mortgagor power to execute a valid second or third mortgage, of the same
premises? The Sales in Bulk Act prohibits, "sale, transfer," etc., of a stock
of goods without complying with the statute. Will the fact that a court
has heretofore in other cases declared that a chattel mortgage is a "sale" or
"transfer" of the title on condition subsequent, rule the decision in a new case
involving the question whether a chattel mortgage is included in this statute?
Although the real nature of a land mortgage may have been declared to be a
"transfer of title," may the mortgagor still be declared "seized of the fee"
in another case? And then under either theory or general principle, may not
the description of who is "the real owner" depend on the particular case?
Even where a statutory provision declared that "the title" was in a chattel
mortgagee, is it surprising to find that the mortgagor was held to be a "sole
and unconditional owner" under a fire insurance policy? On the other hand,
although a court declares its adoption of "the lien theory" and that the mort-
gagor is "really the owner," will it be surprising to find the same court holding
that the mortgagee may be an "owner," for example, under a statute providing
for notice to "owners " in condemnation proceedings? Further enumeration
of cases might be made to indicate the relativity in usage of these general prin-
ciples or theories of the "title" and "lien" nature of a mortgage. For some
purposes, it appears, a given court will speak of a mortgage as a transfer of
"the title "; for other purposes it will refer to a mortgage as a "mere lien."
And, of course, in many cases the nature (in such terms) will not be discussed
at all.
To what extent, then, consume the student's time and energy with these gen-
eralizations, general principles, theories of "lien" and "title" ? How use-
ful is it for students to know that an American court will sometimes write an
opinion to the effect that "the nature" of "a mortgage" is a transfer of "the
title" on condition subsequent and at another time that it is "merely a lien" ?
An answer will be properly forthcoming as follows: that even if "title" and
"lien" theories are both used on occasion by the same court, any person who
hopes to practice law intelligently and successfully must know of these matters
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-these general principles or theories. The courts are using these theories in
dealing with questions in mortgage law and from what courts do and say in
prior cases we predict what they may do in the new case. Admitting this,
precisely as stated, the answer should not be taken for more than it answers.
One learns from the reports each day that the courts are not ordinary slot-
machines, whether or not we welcome a given decision. Experience is nursing
a notion that the courts are judges and that judges have pleasures, pains and
other behavior complexes, frequently called emotions, like other human beings.
This tends to lead to a belief that a written opinion of judges, like an opinion
expressed, orally or written, by persons generally, comes after their decision
and serves to describe and report the result, but may little explain why or how
the decision was reached. It may, and very probably does, indicate some of
the influences which came "close to the heart" in making the decision. By
this idea, the opinion in a case containing generalizations, general principles,
theories, is but a report, in terms of those categories, that they were, or at
least may have been, some of the influences which were "close to the hearts"
of the judges when they voted on the particular case.' 5 Clearly, however,
these categories were not the only influences to which the judges were exposed
in the given case. There was the setting (" the statement of facts" and what-
not) of that particular case; the statement of facts and opinions and decisions
of other cases, arguments by the particular counsel, etc. Apparently there is no
technique known to scientific men which, as yet, will enable one to enumer-
ate, even in one's own deciding, all of the influences upon one which are con-
ducive to the making of a given decision. Much more doubtful, would it seem,
that one would have any simple formula or method to explain how or why
others, judges, for example, decided a given case. When it comes to finding a
technique or method useful for prophesying how these same persons, judges,
let us say, will decide a new case in the future (with its different setting), the
problem, quite clearly it would seem, takes on additional complexity. With
this thought in mind, the answer under consideration must meet with the sug-
gestion that by instructing students in the general principles or theories written
of in opinions with a view of fitting them to meet their career in the practice
of law is (:) to tend to oversimplify to them their problems in practice by
failing to vitalize to them the general problems of treating with human beings;
(2) to tend to mislead them (a) by leaving them ignorant of the fact that they
will be concerned with judges who behave as human beings in deciding cases,
and ignorant of the complexity of the problem of ascertaining what influenced
them to make a prior decision, and what will influence them in making a future
decision, and (b) by tending to overstimulate them with confidence that a de-
duction from what judges said in one case with its setting can be used to fix
what they will decide in another case.
The reviewer's criticism of the traditional case-book on mortgages, however,
goes one step further. It objects to a teaching-tool which scraps or scrambles
the fact-transactions or which isolates into chapter-compartments parts of a
single business operation as it is understood in business practice. Why? Be-
cause of the objective for legal instruction which the reviewer assumes to be
most desirable. This is that the rules of law governing mortgages should be so
presented to the students that they may know that while they are studying the
decisions, and to some extent theory, they are doing so as a means to an end,
namely, to ascertain whether the decisions make mortgages useful or not useful
15 These statements are not intended to indicate the dogma of fatalism, nor to
suggest that the decisions in question are "mere reflex action." It is not intended
to overemphasize the process of rationalization. It is intended, however, not to let
this alleged process pass unnoticed or unemphasized. Intelligent people undoubtedly
can tend to believe pro and con concerning it, pending the results of further research
concerning how human beings make decisions.
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for the purposes to which they are put in business practice. In terms of ulti-
mate objective it is less a question of learning how the courts are dealing with
questions in mortgage law; it is more a question of stimulating inquiry into
what kind of job they are doing as measured by the given objective.
For the sole purpose of illustrating his criticism the reviewer will venture
to state in briefest outline a part of a substitute case-book on mortgages. In
selecting materials for the main part of such a case-book the fact-transactions
in the cases would assume primary importance; the materials would be selected
and arranged according to them rather than according to a theory or general
principle of law. They would be classified and assembled according to the
business operation presented. Enough cases involving the same business prob-
lem would be used to specify, as fully as space and materials permitted, the
utility and lack of utility of mortgages in a given business problem -as, for
example; assets available for mortgage security borrowing,'6 floating the loan, 17
interference of the outstanding security in transactions by and between the
parties during the life of the loan, 18 refinancing, embracing extensions and
renewals,' 9 payment or other discharge,20 the debt becoming outlawed,21 the
borrower becoming insolvent or bankrupt. 22  But this case-book would not
consider mortgages only as a financing tool. Their utility, under the rules of
law, would be put up for examination when sought to be used in other ways,
for example, by manufacturer, builder or marketing association to secure the
supply of raw materials, materials or produce, and by the distributor in secur-
ing the distribution of his goods; and thus, "clogs on the equity of redemp-
tion " versus "agreements for collateral advantage " in some cases would be-
come a live problem of marketing. Introductory to such a presentation of case
material on mortgages-in-use, there would be a group of case materials, chosen
at random as to the business operation involved, designed primarily to acquaint
the student with the various types of paper transactions which the courts
treat as "mortgages," for example, deeds of conveyance and bills of sale with
the condition subsequent therein and with and without "powers of sale"
therein, deeds and bills absolute in form, deeds of trust, "leases," statutory
forms, executory agreements and others. Here the student will learn of what
is "a mortgage." "Lien theory," "title theory" and other generalizations or
principles would be available for consideration in passing, as would be true in
the main division above mentioned; the relativity of their usage and their im-
portance as factors in the decisions of judges would come out in connection
16 Herein, for example, of purchase-money mortgages, mortgages by B on assets
bought from S by A for B, mortgages with an after-acquired clause covering future-
acquired fixed assets, crops, stock in trade, receivables, future earnings, etc.
17 Herein, for example, of matters which should be attended to at the time the
security documents are executed -cases on rights to possession between mortgagor
and mortgagee, coverage of offspring of livestock, use, sale and removal clauses, in-
security clauses, etc.; of other matters -instalment advances, i.e., "future ad-
vances," "conditional mortgages," e.g., to secure obligations "when, as, and if"
issued, etc.
Is Herein, for example, cases concerning powers and privileges of user by mort-
gagor, rents and profits, leases, sales, additional mortgages by mortgagor, his pro-
tection against torts of mortgagee and third persons.19 Herein, for example, of mortgages for antecedent unsecured indebtedness,
cases of agreements to "extend," to "renew," substitution of collateral on "old
debt," etc.
20 Herein, for example, of -liquidation by cash, obligations not legal tender -
third party's notes, surrender of part or whole of the property to mortgagee, etc.
21 Herein chiefly of the Statute of Limitations.
22 Herein, for example, of how mortgages can and cannot be used immediately
before insolvency or bankruptcy, e.g., giving preferential security; how a discharge
affects the mortgage security, etc.
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with the main pedagogical purpose of the section. The book would be so con-
structed on the assumption that the most useful end of legal instruction is to
study how the rules of mortgage law render mortgages useful and not useful
for particular purposes for which they are sought to be used in the business
community. It would be so constructed in order to point out just how a given
rule works in a given business transaction, in order to promote an understand-
ing of its effect so that if there is any doubt about its utility a case is clearly
stated for research into those business affairs where it has effect.
Lastly, it seems permissible to emphasize, that there can scarcely be a taboo
against questioning the traditional teaching-tool and the type of instruction
which it facilitates. Our experience in scientifically teaching law in law schools
by the case method (which may still be practiced in small classes) is of re-
markably recent origin; and still, it is submitted, is to be considered in an
experimental stage.
WESLEY A. STURGES.
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS. Including Gifts Causa Mortis and a Sum-
mary of the Law of Descent, Distribution, and Administration. Second
Edition. By John R. Rood. Chicago: Callaghan & Company. 1926.
pp. ix, 1112.
The first edition of Mr. Rood's book was published in 1904 and was briefly
reviewed in the HARvARD LAW REvI w.1 The first edition contained a total of
701 pages as compared with iii2 in the second edition. The increase in the
number of pages is due partly to a considerable extension in the footnotes,
citing the more important of recent cases with occasional brief comment, but
more especially to additions in the body of the text dealing in particular with
election, acceptance, renunciation, powers, and rights of legatees. Occasional
sections are added, however, throughout the book. The new edition is printed
on good paper in good clear type and presents a pleasing appearance on the
whole.
In spite of the criticism that follows, the reviewer believes that this book
is by far the best hand-book on wills obtainable and that as a rule it is accu-
rate and reliable for so summary a treatment. There are many features
which will prove a help to young lawyers, such in particular as those sug-
gestions contained under the headings "Do These Things " and "These Things
Avoid." 2 An excellent illustration is given of the method to be followed in
computing kinship.3 In fact the admirable features of the book are too many
to mention in detail. It is clear and readable.
Certain minor defects are found in the book. Is the statement quite true
that a gift obtained by fraud is always void? "It does not matter that the
person benefited by the provision was not a party to the fraud." 4 Further,
is it true always that the date is no part of the will? "When material the
true date may be shown." 5 It is suggested that the competency of a subscrib-
ing witness to a will is a question of fact for the jury. Is not the competency
of a young child to attest and subscribe a question of law for the court? 6 It
is said that a will invalidly executed may become valid by republication. 7 Is
not this a problem of incorporation rather than of republication?
3 (1905) I8 HARV. L. REV. 509.
2 §§ 318a, 318b.
3 § 766.
4 § r71. See Anderson v. Bailey, [X902] 2 Ch. 936. Cf. Dye v. Parker, io8 Kan.
304, 194 Pac. 640 (1921), rehearing, i95 Pac. 599 (1922).
5 § 173. See contra: In re Baum's Estate, 260 Pa. St. 33, IO3 AtI. 614 (1918).
6 § 312. See Jones v. Tibbetts, 57 Mo. 572 (187o).
7 § 1o7.
